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Sarah E. Hamill*

Of Malls and Campuses: The Regulation
of University Campuses and Section 2(b)
of the Charter

There have been a number of recent cases from across Canada about whether
the Charter applies to public universities. Courts in Alberta have suggested that
the Charter will apply to public universities while courts in British Columbia and
Ontario have refused to apply the Charter to such cases. In this article I focus
on the cases that also involve a claim to use university space, that is, those
cases where there is an argument that by failing to allow an event on campus
the university has violated the free expression guarantee in the Charter. If the
Charter does apply and I argue that it does, this matters for how we conceive
of university property It is too simplistic to hold that university property is private
and, as such, section 2(b) should grant a right of access to some instances of
university property under certain circumstances.
Des affaires rdcentes un peu partout au Canada portaient sur la question de
savoir si la Charte s'appliqueaux universitds publiques. Les tribunaux de lAlberta
ont tranch6 que la Charte s'applique aux universitds publiques, tandis que ceux
de Colombie-Britannique et de I'Ontario ont refuse d'appliquer la Charte dans
des cas similaires. Dans cet article, Iauteur examine les dossiers qui comportent
en outre une demande d'utiliser Iespace de l'universit6, cest-a-dire ceux oL
une partie avance I'argument que le refus par l'universit6 d'autoriser la tenue
d'un 6vdnement sur son campus a viold la libert6 d'expression garantie dans la
Charte. Si la Charte sapplique, et c'est ce que pretend Iauteure, cela peut influer
sur notre conception de ce qui appartient aux universitds. 11 est trop simpliste de
soutenir que les biens d'une universit6 sont propridtd privde; par consequent, le
paragraphe 2(b) devrait, dans certaines circonstances, donner acces a certains
elments appartenant a l'universit6.

* Lecturer, The City Law School, City, University of London I thank Ola Malik, Lisa Austin and
an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. The usual caveats apply.
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Introduction
"No support is needed for the proposition that universities are established
in the public interest to serve a public purpose, or the importance, in some
cases, of the physical facilities used to that end."' Here, Willcock J.A.,
writing for a unanimous British Columbia Court of Appeal in British
Columbia Civil Liberties Association v. University of Victoria, linked the
physical space of universities with their role and purpose. It was, for him,
so obvious as to hardly need saying. However, just because the two are
linked does not mean that students (or anyone else for that matter) have
the right to access university property for the purposes of free expression.
The expression at issue in BCCL CA involved attempts of antiabortion activists to hold graphic protests on campus, and BCCL CA is
but one of a growing number of similar cases. 2 When these anti-abortion
protests do go ahead, whether or not they have been officially sanctioned,
the response is often vehement opposition which sometimes results in
the protesters facing verbal and even physical attacks.3 Consequently, a
number of Canada's public universities have become reluctant or have
refused to allow anti-abortion protests to go ahead on campus, whether
they take the form of a demonstration or a poster display. Additionally,
several anti-abortion groups have been denied or have lost official club

1.
British Columbia Civil LibertiesAssociation v University of ictoria,2016 BCCA 162 at para 10
[BCCL CA] aff'gBC Civil LibertiesAssociationv University of ictoria, 2015 BCSC 39 [BCCL].
2.
Lobo v Carleton University, 2012 ONCA 498, [2012] OJ No 3161 [Lobo]; Wilson v University
of Calgary, 2014 ABQB 190 [Wilson].

3.

BCCL, supra note 1 at para 58.
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status which affects their ability to access and use campus spaces.' Are
universities entitled to prevent such protests from taking place and, if so,
is that not a violation of the right to free expression as guaranteed by
section 2(b) of the CanadianCharter of Rights and Freedoms?5 It is here
courts have split, with those in Alberta and Saskatchewan finding that the
Charter does apply to public universities and those in British Columbia
and Ontario holding that it does not.6
In claiming that they have the right to protest on university campuses,
anti-abortion activists typically argue that the Charter applies to public
universities and, moreover, that in denying access to campus space
these universities are unduly infringing section 2(b) of the Charter.' In
so arguing, the anti-abortion groups face an uphill struggle, as it is far
from clear that the Charter applies to public universities and, even if it
does apply, it is equally uncertain whether it would grant them access to
university property for the purposes of free expression. Both these issues
raise questions about where to draw the line between what is public and
what is private.
For the Charterto apply to the acts of a public university, these acts
must somehow fall under the ambit of government action.' Clearly, the
Charter will not apply to a private university such as British Columbia's
Trinity Western University, but simply being a public institution does not
result in a duty of Chartercompliance in all spheres of institutional action.
A number of lower courts have asserted that the question of the Charter's
applicability to public universities has been answered in the negative:
the Charter does not apply.9 The authority they cite for such a claim is,
however, over a quarter-century old and dealt with university policies about

4.

See, e.g., Michelle Da Silva, "Campus Crusade: Pro-Lifers Fight for Club Status at Ryerson"

Now Toronto (18 November 2015), online: <www.nowtoronto.com/news/campus-crusade-pro-life-

club-at-ryerson>.
5.
CanadianCharterofRights and Freedoms, Part I ofthe ConstitutionAct, 1982 being Schedule
B to the CanadaAct, 1982 (UK), 1982, el, s 2(b) [Charter].Lobo, supra note 2; BCCL, supra note

1; Wilson, supra note 2. The cases are discussed below.
6.
7.

R v Whatcott, 2002 SKQB 399, [2003] 4 WWR 149 [Whatcott (Regina)]; Wilson, supra note 2.
The one exception is Gray v Alma Mater Society of the University of British Columbia, 2003

BCSC 864, 15 BCLR (4th) 358 [Gray] as there the anti-abortion activists conceded the point about
Charterapplicability.
8.
Charter supra note 5, s 32. For earlier discussions of the Charterand public universities, see:
Christopher Henderson, "Searching for "Government Action": Post-Secondary Education as a Case
Study in the Conceptual Weaknesses of the Charter's Government Action Doctrine" (2005) 15 Educ
&LJ 233; Franco Silletta, "Revisiting Charter Application to Universities" (2015) 20 Appeal Current
L & L Reform 79; Craig Jones, "Immunizing Universities from CharterReview: Are We Contracting
Out Censorship?" (2003) 52 UNBLJ 261.
9.
Lobo, supra note 2; BCCL, supra note 2; Telfer v University of Western Ontario, 2012 ONSC
1287 [Telfer]
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mandatory retirement."o The hiring and retiring of university staff is hardly
central to the specifically public functions of a university. A close reading
of McKinney v. University of Guelph strongly suggests that the Supreme
Court of Canada left room for the Charterto apply in other contexts; it is
this reading that courts in Alberta and Saskatchewan have followed, even
if their counterparts in Ontario and British Columbia disagree."
What the Ontario and British Columbia courts overlook is that since
McKinney a substantial amount of jurisprudence has flowed from the
Supreme Court about government actionl 2 and about the role ofthe Charter
more broadly. The more recent jurisprudence may not be specifically about
13
universities but is about which actions must comply with the Charter,
the role of Charter values when Charter rights do not apply," and where
and under what circumstances Charter rights can be exercised." Public
universities are caught in an intersection of these ideas, which results
in a more complicated picture than the simple claim that the Charter
does not apply. While the periodic discussions of Charter applicability
to universities have focused on the question of government action they
have tended to overlook the physical space of universities themselves. Are
the campuses of public universities private property? Are all parts of the
campus private property? Is it not possible that if some of a university's
acts fall under government action this could matter for how we conceive
of the physical space of the university itself?
In this article I examine recent case law which involves notjust a claim
that the Charter applies to universities but also a claim to use campus
facilities for the exercise of a Charter right, namely free expression. I
argue that the question of free expression cannot be so readily excised
from the question of space and that without paying attention to the tacit

10.
11.
note
12.

McKinney v University of Guelph, [1990] 3 SCR 229, 2 OR (3d) 319 [McKinney cited to SCR].
Pridgen v University of Calgary, 2012 ABCA 139 350 DLR (4th) 1 [Pridgen]; Wilson, supra
2; Whatcott (Regina), supranote 6 at paras 40-45.
Charter,supra note 5, s 32.

13. For a discussion of this jurisprudence, see Pridgen, supra note 11 at paras 78-99.
14. See, e.g., Hill v Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 SCR 1130, 24 OR (3d) 865; Mark D Walters,
"Respecting Deference as Respect: Rights, Reasonableness and Proportionality in Canadian
Administrative Law" in Hanna Wilberg & Mark Elliott, eds, The Scope and Intensity of Judicial
Review: Traversing TaggartsRainbow (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015) 395 at 412; Jamie Cameron,
"Giving and Taking Offence: Civility, Respect, and Academic Freedom" in James L Turk, Academic
Freedom in Conflict: The Struggle Over FreeSpeech Rights in the University (Toronto: James Lorimer

& Co, 2014) 287 at 297-298.
15. See, e.g., Committee for the Commonwealth of Canadav Canada, [1991] 1 SCR 139, 77 DLR
(4th) 385 [Commonwealth of Canada cited to SCR]; Ramsden v Peterborough (City), [1993] 2 SCR
1084, 15 OR (3d) 548 [Ramsden cited to SCR]; Montreal (city) v 2952 -1366 Quebec Inc, 2005 SCC

62, [2005] 3 SCR 141 [Montreal (City)]. See also Vancouver (City) v Zhang, 2010 BCCA 450, 325
DLR (4th) 313 [Zhang].
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property law arguments, any victories with respect to the application of the
Charterwill be hollow. The reason the victories would be hollow is that the
public-private distinction of section 32 is echoed in the question of what
spaces are available for section 2(b) rights. In short, even if universities
are public enough for the Charter,their property might well be private and
thus unavailable for section 2(b).
My argument is not that all of a public university's buildings should
be open for free expression but that, under certain circumstances, there
ought to be some space on campus which is open. I should also make
it clear that I am not arguing for the appearance of the old public forum
doctrine which was briefly seen in the United States.1 6 For one thing, it is
not clear that university campuses are exactly comparable to malls and
other types of privately owned, yet publicly accessible property. My point
is that the nature of universities themselves and the close relationship
between academic freedom and free expression ought to result in their
physical spaces being more open to free expression than they currently
are." If certain aspects of a public university's functions can fall under
government action-and I argue that they can and do-then the application
of the historical function test should result in university property being
open to free expression."
I begin by briefly setting out the concepts of government action, public
property, and free expression as they might apply to public universities
in Canada. The first two concepts seem readily identifiable but both
the practice and theory are more complex than they appear. Similarly,
free expression has proven to be a concept in flux and there have been
a number of controversies surrounding what constitutes free expression
on campus, with a particular concern about safe spaces which are free
from discriminatory, offensive or upsetting speech.19 The second section
examines the recent divergence between Alberta and two other provinces,
namely British Columbia and Ontario. The third section examines what

16. See, e.g., Timothy Zick, "Property, Place, and Public Discourse" (2006) 21 Wash U JL & Pol'y
173.
17. For more on this relationship, see Cameron, supra note 14.
18. The historical function test is taken from Montreal (City), supra note 15 at para 74.
19. This is an international concern; for some recent discussion in the American context as the result
of a scandal on Yale University's Campus, see, e.g., Adrienne Green, "Do Historically Black Colleges
Provide the Safe Spaces Students are After?" The Atlantic (19 November 2015), online: <www.
For a
theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/11/are-hbcus-necessary-racial-sanctuaries/416694>;
Canadian discussion see, David Watson, "Delineating Safe Spaces Key to Protecting Free Speech
on University Campuses" The McGill Tribune (24 November 2015), online: <mcgilltribune.com/
opinion/lessons-from-yale-delineating-safe-spaces-key-to-protecting-free-speech-102937>; See also
Cameron, supra note 14.
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a finding of Charter applicability would mean for who gets to access
university property to exercise section 2 (b) rights.
I.

Public or private: Universitiesand their campuses, government
action, andfree expression
There are three questions central to the recent spate of cases about free
expression on university campuses. These are if and when universities will
be caught by the idea of government action; how property is divided into
public and private, particularly in the context of universities; and what are
the values of and acceptable limits on free expression? The last question
also calls to mind the additional one of how free expression relates to
academic freedom. For ease of analysis, this section is sub-divided to deal
with each question in turn. Running through each section is the difficulty
of offering a clear dividing line between public and private.
1. Public bodies but not government? Section 32 andpublic universities
By virtue of section 32 of the Charter, the Charter only applies to
government action. It does not apply to private actors and will not apply in
solely private disputes, though such disputes may well fall under provincial
human rights legislation.2 0 However, modem government is complex,
consisting of the three traditional branches of government-the executive,
the legislature, and the judiciary-as well as a vast administrative state
whose constituent parts differ widely in their structure and powers, to say
nothing of the various private entities and autonomous statutory bodies
charged with implementing government policy. Consequently, the question
of which bodies and which acts will be caught by section 32 is something
of a Gordian knot as there is no longer (if there ever was) a clear-cut
distinction between public action and private action. 2 1 As yet, Canadian
courts have not found a test which can untangle the knot. Instead, since
1982, they have, to continue the metaphor, tied themselves in knots. In this
sub-section, I offer a brief overview of section 32 jurisprudence. As will
become clear, part of the problem lies in the fact that the test, as applied
to public universities, seems subjective and has led to a range of different
answers to the same or similar questions.

20.

Whatcott (Regina), supranote 6 at para 11.

21. For critique of the public-private divide, see: Patricia Hughes, "The Intersection of Public and
Private Under the Charter" (2003) 52 UNBLJ 201 at 201; Allan C Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf A
Critique ofRights and Freedoms (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) at 120-128.
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Despite an early flurry of academic interest in synthesizing and
distilling the case law on section 32,22 the most recent and comprehensive
survey comes from Paperny J.A. of the Alberta Court ofAppeal in Pridgen
v. University of Calgary.2 3 Her analysis is particularly relevant given that
she applied it to the University of Calgary. Justice Papemy identified five
categories of "government or government activities to which the Charter
applies." 2 4 These categories were: legislative enactments including
regulations and by-laws;2 5 bodies that are government actors by nature,
such as provincial governments but also municipalities;2 6 bodies that are
government by virtue of the degree of legislative control over them, also
known as the "government control test," such as community colleges and
transit authorities;2 7 bodies which exercise statutory authority and act in a
".governmental capacity" particularly when such bodies have a statutorily
granted coercive power which is greater than that exercised by a private
individual;2 8 and "non-governmental bodies implementing government
objectives" such as hospitals.2 9 The last two categories are designed to
prevent the government from "contracting out" of their constitutional
obligations by delegating authority to non-governmental entities. These
five categories are neither closed nor mutually exclusive.3 0
As useful as Paperny J.A.'s summary is, her application to the
University of Calgary has two drawbacks: first, the other two decisions in
Pridgen did not fully discuss the Charter issue and secondly, McKinney
remains the last word from the Supreme Court of Canada about the
Charter's application to universities. McKinney was one of a quartet of
cases about whether a hospital, a community college, and two public

22. See, e.g., A Anne McLellan & Bruce P Elman, "To Whom Does the Charter Apply?-Some
Recent Cases on Section 32" (1986) 24:2 Alta L Rev 361; Dale Gibson, "Distinguishing the Governors
from the Governed: The Meaning of Government Under Section 32(1) of the Charter" (1983) 13 Man
LJ 505; Gordon P Crann, "How Far Does the CharterReach?-a Theoretical Review of the Section
32(1) Debate and Canada's Emerging Governmental Action Doctrine" (1989) 47:1 UT Fac L Rev 156.
23. Pridgen, supra note 11; Jennifer Koshan, "Face-ing the Charter's Application on University
Campuses" ABlawg.ca (13 June 2012), online: <ablawg.ca/2012/06/13/face-ing-the-chartersapplication-on-university-campuses-5>.
24. Pridgen, supra note 11 at para 78.
25. Ibid at para 79.
26. Ibidatparas 80-81.
27. Ibid at paras 82-84; Douglas/Kwantlen FacultyAssociation v Douglas College, [1990] 3 SCR
570, 77 DLR (4th) 94 [Douglas/Kwantlencited to SCR]; Greater Vancouver TransportationAuthority
v CanadianFederationofStudents-British Columbia Component, 2009 SCC 31, [2009] 2 SCR 295
[GVTA].
28. Pridgen, supra note 11 at paras 85-93, quote from para 86 citing Godbout v Longueuil (City),

[1997] 3 SCR 844 at para 49, 152 DLR (4th) 577.
29. Pridgen, supra note 11 at paras 94-98.
30. Ibid at para 99.
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universities were caught by section 32.31 These decisions were famously
complex and show how confused and contradictory the Court's approach
to section 32 was in the early years. A majority of the Court said that the
test for determining if the Charter applied was the structural connection
of these institutions to the government, a test which centred on the degree
of direct control of the government over the body. As such, community
colleges were caught by section 32 but hospitals and universities were not,
due the autonomy of their decision-making processes.
In dissent, Wilson J. suggested that the better questions might be
whetherthe government had "general control," whetherthe body performed
a government function, and whether it "acts pursuant to statutory authority
specifically granted to it to enable it to further an objective that government
seeks to promote in the broader public interest?"3 2 Confusingly, Cory and
L'Heureux-Dube JJ. agreed with Wilson J.'s test, though L'Heureux-Dube
J. found that it did not result in the Charter applying to universities. Here,
L'Heureux-Dube J. agreed with La Forest J.'s reasoning. In short, there
was ample disagreement over which test to use and what resulted from the
proposed tests.
Seven years after McKinney, a unanimous Court clarified the test in
Eldridge v. British Columbia (AG).3 3 Eldridge made it clear that hospitals,
when they provide medically necessary services, namely those specified
in the Hospital Insurance Act,34 are delivering "a specific government
program."3 5 However, La Forest J. was careful to point out that his
conclusion in Eldridge was in keeping with his decision in Stoffman.
Stoffman, like McKinney, dealt with retirement policies and as such
policies are purely a matter of internal regulation they did not invoke the
Charter. The Charteronly applies to non-governmental entities when they
are engaging in the delivery of a governmental policy or program.
In light of the jurisprudence since McKinney, Paperny J.A. found that
there were two routes to the Charter's applicability to the University of
Calgary. The first was the Eldridge test which, given that post-secondary
education is a "specific objective of the Alberta legislature," meant that the
Charterapplied to questions about student discipline.3 6 The second was the
statutory compulsion framework because the disciplinary sanctions of a
31. McKinney, supra note 10; Harrison v University of British Columbia, [1990] 3 SCR 451, 77
DLR (4th) 55; Douglas/Kwantlen,supra note 27; Stoffman v Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3

SCR 483, 76 DLR (4th) 700.
32.
33.
34.

McKinney, supra note 10 at 370.
Eldridge v British Columbia (AG), [1997] 3 SCR 624, 151 DLR (4th) 577 [Eldridge].
Hospital InsuranceAct, RSBC, 1996, c 204.

35.
36.

Eldridge, supra note 33 at paras 42-52.
Pridgen, supra note 11 at paras 101-104.
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university went beyond that of a private organization.3 7 Notably, in Alberta,
the punishments for students are set out in the Post-SecondaryLearning
Act,38 which means that a student's relationship with the university is not
one of contract and is akin to that of "professional regulatory bodies."3 9
Nonetheless, as will become clear in part II, La Forest J.'s comment in
McKinney that "the basis of the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction by the
courts is not that the universities are government, but that they are public
decision makers""o continues to be persuasive to courts outside of Alberta
and Saskatchewan. Such a holding means that universities are subject to
administrative law but not the Charter.
2. Universityproperty:public, private or both?
In terms of attempts to access property for the purposes of free expression,
the section 32 inquiry is only the first step in the argument. Even assuming
that a court will find the Charter to apply to a particular body and its
challenged act, such a finding does not mean that an individual will
automatically gain the right to use that body's property for free expression.
Most free expression jurisprudence that also invokes the question of access
to property involves municipal streets and parks. Before examining the
jurisprudence, it is helpful to unsettle the meaning of public property and
to highlight that the same public-private divide which bedevils section 32
also matters for how property is understood.
There are some forms of property which are obviously private: a
person's house, for example, orthe offices ofa corporation. Yet the common
law has long recognized that some forms of otherwise private property are
rendered public by virtue of the services they provide. Innkeepers offer
the classic and ancient example: inns must take all comers provided that
the inn in question has room. Such a requirement was often sweetened
by the granting of a liquor license to innkeepers. Conversely, some forms
of public property are managed as though they are private property. For
example, the public ownership of natural resources in Canada is managed
by the government as though these resources were private property."1
In terms of the modem urban sphere, malls, subways, enclosed urban
pathways, and airports are examples of property that have both public and

37.
38.

Ibid at para 105.
Post-SecondaryLearningAct, SA2003, cP-19.5, s 31.

39.

Pridgen, supra note 11 at paras 105-107.

40.

McKinney, supra note 10 at 268.

41. Even though such property is owned by the Crown, the common law has long recognized that
Crown ownership is not necessarily determinative of public rights to that property. See, e.g., Reference
re British Columbia Fisheries, [1913] UKPC 63 at 16, 5 WWR 878 (suggesting the Crown had the
same rights as a private owner with respect to inland fisheries).
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private aspects. Sorting out which is which-and what that might mean

for rights of access-is then further complicated by the absence of much
theorizing about public property, or any property which is not owned by a
private individual.42 Nevertheless, there are two main ways to categonze
property as public or private: the owner or how that property is used.
Canada follows both approaches with the inquiry into ownership coming
first and use coming second.
If the property in question is privately owned, such as a mall, then
even though there is an invitation for the public to enter the owner can
revoke it at any time. While courts in the United States briefly flirted with
the public forum doctrine which allowed free expression on properties
like malls, they retreated from that position in the 1970s.43 Courts in
Canada were never quite so bold and have only allowed for a deviation
from the private owner's right to exclude if it is mandated by legislation.
Historically, labour legislation offered one exception to the whims of the
owner," and today human rights protections could offer another." Similar
anti-discrimination provisions exist to protect would-be tenants renting
dwelling spaces. The landlord-tenant relationship may be one of private
law but it is one in which the balance of power has been altered by statute.
We would not think that anti-discrimination provisions in landlord and
tenant law turn rental properties into public property; they merely ensure
that they are equally accessible to all people able to pay the rent asked.
Although the regulation of private property necessarily affects how
that property may be used, the question of use in a definitional sense only
arises if the property is owned by government. Then the question becomes
whether the property in question is open to the public or whether it is closed
to the public and thus private. Examples of private government property
are ministerial offices and army bases; such places are not ordinarily open
to the public. Streets and parks are more obviously open to the public but
even that is no guarantee that an individual may exercise Charter rights
there. Put simply, the nature of the expressive activity must fit with the
historical function of the property.46 Under the historical-use test, it would
be doubtful if an individual would win the right to hold a protest march
42. Though this trend is starting to reverse. See, e.g., Anna di Robilant, "Common Ownership
and Equality of Autonomy" (2012) 58:2 McGill U 263; Sarah E Hamill, "Private Rights to Public
Property: The Evolution of Common Property in Canada" (2012) 58:2 McGill U 365; Michael
Robertson, "Common Property Redux" (2016) 49:2 UBC L Rev 563.
43. See Zick, supra note 16.
44. This exemption was discussed in Harrisonv Carswell, [1976] 2 SRC 200 at 219, [1975] 6 WWR
673.
45.
46.

See Whatcott (Regina), supra note 16 at para 11.
Montreal (City), supra note 11 at para 74.
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on a major highway, as the historical function of such highways is hardly
well-suited to expressive activity.
The result of the owner-then-use inquiry into the nature of property is
that the jurisprudence is deferential towards private property. Courts may
well have recognized that their strictness here could work a disadvantage
towards certain kinds of people when malls offer the only form of "public"
space readily available to them,17 a situation which becomes all the more
pressing during cold winter days. Of course, no Canadian court would
consider the provision of shelter to be a government activity sufficient to
invoke the Charter. To an extent, a person's homelessness cannot force
the government to act, but homeless people are allowed to build their own
nighttime shelter in parks and governments cannot prevent them from
so doing without providing alternative shelter." Consequently, even if
people do use malls and underground tunnels to shelter themselves from
the weather they may only do so on sufferance from the owner. The same
rule applies for expressive activity in malls and other forms of publicly
accessible yet privately owned property: without the owner's permission
there is no right and even with the owner's permission there is only a
privilege. All of which leaves a relatively limited physical space for free
expression.49
Assuming that the Charter will apply to public universities, the
question then becomes whether university property is public or private?
In 1994 the Ontario Court of Appeal had occasion to comment about the
nature of Queen's University campus. The case arose out of a lawful strike
by CUPE Local 229 and centred on the question of whether the employees
could picket in certain buildings on campus."o Under Ontario's labour
legislation at that time, employees were allowed to picket on premises "to
which the public normally has access and from which a person occupying
the premises would have a right to remove individuals."" Such a rule was
designed to allow picketing in malls, but would it apply to universities?
The campus was described as "comprised of privately owned buildings
47. R vAsante-Mensah, 2003 SCC 38 at para 24, [2003] 2 SCR 3. Such rules do work a disadvantage;
see Parkdale Community Legal Services, "Submissions to the Task Force on the Law Concerning
Trespass to Publicly Used Property as it Affects Youth and Minorities" (1997) 35:3&4 Osgoode Hall
LJ 819. This is also aproblem elsewhere; see, e.g.,Appleby & othersv UnitedKingdom, No 44306/98,
[2003] ECHR 222, 37 EHRR 38.
48.

Abbotsford (City) v Shantz, 2015 BCSC 1909, 392 DLR (4th) 106; ictoria(City) vAdams, 2009

BCCA 563, 313 DLR (4th) 29.
49. See also: Sarah E Hamill, "Location Matters: How Nuisance Governs Access to Property for
Free Expression" (2014) 47:1 UBC L Rev 129 [Hamill, "Location Matters"].
50. Queen s University at Kingston v CUPE Local 229, 120 DLR (4th) 717, 76 OAC 356 at paras
5-6 [Queen s University].

51.

Ibid at para 10.
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and property as well as municipally owned public streets and sidewalks."5 2
As to whether the public normally had access, the parties agreed that
university residences ought to be excluded with no picketing allowed
there,5 3 but they disagreed about a particular academic building and another
building which contained various shops and services." The union tried to
argue that these buildings should be considered those to which the public
ordinarily had access but this argument was unsuccessful. Technically the
issue on appeal was whether the lower court had jurisdiction to grant an
injunction against the picketers. Nonetheless the Court of Appeal agreed
with the lower court's determination on the question of property. None of
the buildings at issue was open to the public in the way envisioned by the
legislation." Only those with some affiliation to Queen's, be it student,
staff, faculty, alumni, or guest thereof, had "the right to remain and use the
facilities" while others were "routinely" removed by security personnel.5 6
It is questionable how far Queen University would apply to other
universities. It is not uncommon for universities to open up their sports
facilities and libraries to members of the public, even if they charge a
small fee for access. Similarly, members of the public might not be able
to readily distinguish between what is municipally owned and what is
university-owned. They might cut across the open spaces on campus, for
example. Other university campuses also have large public transit centres
on campus, which raises questions about the public's right to access
campuses." Even if campus security does regularly remove non-affiliated
people, it should go without saying that some kinds of people are more
likely to be targeted as being non-affiliated than others." If it really were
the case that only affiliated people are allowed in certain areas, universities
could install card readers such as those which are common in some British
university buildings and which are seen at the University of Toronto's
Robarts Library.5 9

52. Ibid at para 6.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid at paras 8-9.
55. Queen s University v CUPE Local 229, 120 DLR (4th) 717, 1994 CarswellOnt 536 at para 19.
56. Ibid. Here, it would seem as though the court erred in its use of "right" and the better term would
be "privilege."
57. Such campuses include York University's Keele Campus in Toronto, ON, UBC's main campus
in Vancouver, BC, the University of Victoria, the University of Alberta's North Campus in Edmonton,
AB, and the University of Calgary's main campus.
58. See, e.g., Parkdale Community Legal Services, supranote 47 at 820, 825-826.
59. Individuals can only access Robarts' stacks if they have a pass; see: <onesearch.library.utoronto.
ca/robarts-stack-access>.
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Barbourv. University ofBritish Columbia also examined a university's
property rights.6 0 Barbour was a challenge to the University of British
Columbia's (UBC) enforcement provisions of its parking regulations
on the grounds that they were ultra vires the university's delegated
legislation. UBC agreed that these provisions were ultra vires but argued
that it could rely on its common law rights as a property owner.6 1 There
was no question as to whether UBC could regulate parking on campus,
only whether it could collect fines and tow offending vehicles. The British
Columbia Supreme Court held that while UBC may have had the same
rights as a private owner,6 2 these rights did not include the power to tow
vehicles or to collect fines.6 3 Following Barbour, the legislature of BC
amended the UniversityAct to give UBC the power to enforce its parking
regulations and made this power retroactive.6 4 In other words, UBC
has a statutory power greater than that given to private individuals with
respect to regulating parking on its property. Notably, the court held that
the "doctrine of ultra vires continues to apply to corporations created by
special act for public purposes."65
A close reading of the case law on universities, either in terms
of government action or what rights they have with respect to their
property, suggests the picture is more complicated than it first appears.
Public universities are creatures of statute and these statutes tend to grant
universities special powers and privileges both as universities and in terms
of their property. University legislation, for example, often exempts the
campus from municipal property taxes. In addition, the campuses of many
public universities are often made up of an inter-locking system of public
and university property, without which the university could not function.
The vast majority of York University's students, staff, and faculty, for
example, live beyond easy walking distance of campus and must drive or
take transit to reach it. The same could be said for UBC, the University of
Victoria, and the University of Manitoba, to name but a few. Public roads
and public transit are an integral part of the York University campus and
yet posted around campus are signs describing it as "private property."
Such signs are also posted on certain concrete planters on St George Street
as it passes through the University of Toronto's downtown campus. Thus

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
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65.

Barbourv University ofBritish Columbia, 2009 BCSC 425, 310 DLR (4th) 130 [Barbour].
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Ibid at paras 54-57.
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even if section 32 does apply to public universities, that may not be enough
to make their property public enough for section 2(b).
3. Free expression and its limits
There can be no doubt of free expression's importance to democracy.
However, free expression encompasses more than just political speech;
the freedom applies to just about every kind of speech or communication.
In a theoretical sense, expressive activity is central to the development of
"individual agency and identity"6 6 and, as such, it is crucial for the ways in
which we understand ourselves and relate to one another. That being said,
free expression in Canada is not absolute and it is limited by prohibitions
on hate speech as well as certain limits with respect to the location and
form of the expression.6 As the courts are fond of saying, the content of
speech is protected but the form is not. The form-content divide is yet
another example of the public-private distinction, given that questions
of form are about how the content, which would otherwise be private, is
publicized.
With respect to limits on form and location, Canadian courts have
not adopted an identical version of the American time, manner, and place
doctrine but there are echoes of it in Canadian jurisprudence. In the US,
time, manner, and place restrictions are only constitutional if they are
content-neutral, serve a significant governmental interest or objective,
and leave open an alternative method of communication.6 8 The problem
with such limits is that there is nearly always an alternative method of
communication. Canadian courts rarely examine alternative methods of
communication in the justification of restrictions on expression; there
is some case law which references, briefly and in passing, the alternate
methods that could have been used by a person challenging the infringement
of their right.6 9 As laudable as it might be for Canadian courts to have
avoided the time, manner, and place doctrine, in that it does not secondguess a person's choice of forum, the result is much the same as in the US
but with less discussion of the values of free expression.
The Canadianjurisprudence on free expression has long been criticized
for failing to grasp the social nature of the right." The Supreme Court
may have recognized that the values which underlie free expression are
66. Richard Moon, The ConstitutionalProtection ofFreedom ofExpression (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2000) at 4 [Moon, ConstitutionalProtection].

67. Such limits are usually justified under section 1 of the Charter.
68. See Zick, supra note 16 at 183.
69. R v Guignard,2002 SCC 14 at para 25, [2002] 1 SCR 472[Guignard]
70. Richard Moon, "Justified Limits on Free Expression: The Collapse of the General Approach to
Limits on Charter Rights" (2002) 40:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 337 at 340.
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"individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing"7 ' but such statements
are rooted in a deeply individualistic understanding of the freedom entailed
by section 2 (b). Like most Charter rights, section 2(b) is designed to
protect against government interference with a right which already exists,
rather than guaranteeing access to "effective communication." 72 The right
is not facilitative; it is preventative. Hand in hand with this preventative
reading of section 2(b), is a judicial reluctance to open up physical space
for free expression. 73 The ideal type of expression is that which does not
impinge on public space or impose costs on the public purse.
In a sense the section 2(b) jurisprudence has failed to grasp that it is
but a single prong of section 2. Section 2's other freedoms-of conscience
and religion, peaceful assembly, and association-highlight the social
aspects of the rights referenced. The narrow construction of section
2(b) and, arguably, section 2(a),7 means that these rights are viewed in
an individualistic manner. If section 2 is looked at as a whole, the rights
guaranteed under section 2(a) and (b) could be linked with the other, more
obviously social rights protected by section 2.71 Section 2(c) also implicitly
invokes the need for space as a "peaceful assembly" typically means (but
would not be limited to) a group of people meeting in a particular location.
Frustratingly, there is very little substantial jurisprudence about section
2(c) as most cases where it could be invoked also involve 2(b) and (d)
rights. What a more holistic reading of section 2 would result in is a more
nuanced approach to free expression, one which is perhaps more restrictive
of harmful speech, more aware of the value of free expression, and more
alert to the importance of space to expressive rights. 76
The current definition of hate speech by the Supreme Court is that
which "a reasonable person, aware of the context and circumstances,
would view... as likely to expose a person or persons to detestation and
vilification on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination."7 7 Sarah
Sorial points out that such a definition focuses on the how of the expression
rather than the content. She notes that such distinctions can miss forms of

71.

Montreal (City), supra note 15 at para 84.

72.
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74.
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speech which are polite and civil yet harmful. 8 In particular she focuses
on the idea of "manufactured authority" which is hate speech disguised
as part of a historical debate, such as Holocaust denial 7 9 Holocaust denial
is, of course, a slippery example of hate speech in that it is rooted in antiSemitism but does not always make any overt references to its underlying
motivations. Sorial also identifies the ways in which hate speech can be
cloaked in authority either by using the spaces of intellectual debate, such
as universities, or by adopting their tropes such as institutes and journals.o
The point of Sorial, Moon, and others is that expression, because of
its social nature, can be harmful and that the courts' hands-off approach to
content restrictions misses this particular harm. There is a sense in which
Sorial's argument challenges the traditional view that the truth will out
through democratic discourse," yet at the same time an equally cogent
argument in favour of Sorial's point is that not everyone has the same
resources to advance their views.8 2 If truth-seeking is truly a value of free
expression then that right might need to impose more positive obligations
than it currently does. As it is, section 2(b) appears cut-off from other
section 2 rights and is conceptualized by the courts as an individual right
which does not impose any positive obligations on government, only that
they refrain from infringing it without justification. Section 2(b) is then
further hindered by the courts' reluctance to allow it to grant strong rights
of access to public places.8 3
It is telling that Sorial's reference to "manufactured authority" invokes
universities. Such a linkage calls two things to mind: first, the links
between academic freedom and free expression, and, second, the sense in
which universities are a privileged space. In recent years the question of
academic freedom has appeared with some regularity in the popular media
and typically involves a discussion of overly restrictive speech codes, the
concept of safe spaces and trigger warnings. Bakan, writing in the late
1990s, pointed out that some restrictions on free expression can actually
enhance the values that underlie free expression by silencing the silencers.
78.
29:1
79.
80.

Sarah Sorial, "Free Speech, Hate Speech, and the Problem of (Manufactured) Authority" (2014)
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He gives the example of restrictions on homophobic speech as allowing
LGBTTQQIA+ people to express themselves "without fear of reprisal." 4
He also gives the example of political correctness codes as opening up
spaces for expression. He notes that "[i]n universities, a predominantly
white, middle-class, and male professoriate has established over the years
what methods and subjects of inquiry are valid" as well as what counts
as appropriate behavior." Bakan's point is that if we do value a diversity
of views, and the arguments in favour of free expression suggest we do,
then we need to create an environment where people can share such views
without fear.
In terms of academic freedom, however, Bakan points out that
universities tend to be self-selecting, meaning that unpopular or minority
views can be repressed or weeded out.8 6 In addition, for at least some
academic disciplines, a small number of schools produce the majority of
professors and this too can have a chilling effect on the diversity of views
expressed. Here Harvard Law School's record at producing law professors
for the rest of the United States in the early part of the twentieth century
offers a classic example.8 7 The point being that even if faculties have an
ethnically and culturally diverse professoriate, they may well have one
which is intellectually inbred.
Perhaps ironically, the policies about civility in universities make
little mention of academic freedom." Certainly the same criticisms of
these policies which Bakan described in the late 1990s continue to exist
today, the main difference being that such efforts at political correctness
or civility seem more widespread at the moment than they were twenty
years ago. More worryingly, there has been a rise in what the English
novelist Howard Jacobson called the "battleground of stated positions"
and the failure to recognize that "thought can be tentative and argument
exploratory." 89 On university campuses the result has been a push for
doctrinal orthodoxy with respect to certain issues, 90 and a kneejerk
tendency to link offence with harm. 91 Jamie Cameron suggests that the
84.

Bakan, supra note 82 at72-73.

85.

Ibid at 73-74.
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better way to enforce civility might be one which is collaborative rather
than coercive.9 2 Such a suggestion seems rooted in the idea that free
expression facilitates discussion which in turn leads to truth.9 3 Yet it too
could fall into the trap of forcing those who are offended, who are likely to
be members of a minority, to do the work of explaining instead of putting
the onus on the majority to understand minority viewpoints and take them
into consideration.
Another way of phrasing the situation might be that academic
freedom is not just the freedom to say controversial or offensive things
but the freedom to explore a diversity of viewpoints before coming to a
conclusion. Ironically, both the self-selecting nature of universities and
their push for civility can undermine such a diversity of opinion. That is
not to say that all opinions are equally valid, or indeed truthful, but rather
that if we do take seriously the idea that free expression is about truthseeking in a social context we need to be exposed to views that differ from
our own.
II. Government action and university property
The recent cases dealing with the question of free expression and access
to university property are often not clear-cut examples of universities
shutting down free speech. In fact, some involve affiliated student
groups refusing to grant access to their space(s) on campus. Nor are
these cases straightforward examples of rights infringement; they are
perhaps more accurately described as examples of conflicting rights. For
example, the University of Victoria Students' Society refused to allow
anti-abortion protests or signs in its building on the grounds that they
violated the society's commitment to gender equality and a woman's right
to choose.9 4 Similar objections exist with respect to attempts to protest
homosexuality on university campuses. In other words, there are equality
and anti-discrimination issues in play as well.9 5 It is not the case that any
homophobic statements will fall under hate speech and thus that public
bodies will be entitled to prevent or limit their expression; nor is it the
case that anti-abortion protests are inherently a threat to gender equality.
At the same time, it is also not the case that such anti-homosexuality
and anti-abortion protesters will automatically have the right to express
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themselves wherever they choose. I should make it clear that my point is
not to defend the opinions espoused in such protests. I, like many others,
find their views offensive; in fact, their views are probably squarely in the
minority on most university campuses, if not in society more broadly. The
fact that such views are in the minority should not be taken as evidence
that the battle for abortion rights, gender equality, and equal treatment
regardless of sexuality have been won. Much work remains to be done
in these areas. My concern is whether or not the Charter ought to apply
to public universities as they make decisions about who can access their
property for the purposes of free expression.
The recent spate of cases from British Columbia, Alberta, and Ontario
is but the latest salvo in a lengthy battle over access to university property.
Some ten years earlier, two cases from Saskatchewan and British Columbia
dealt with similar issues. The first involved William Whatcott's distribution
of anti-abortion pamphlets on the campus of the University of Regina.9 6
Whatcott was charged and convicted of "the unlawful distribution of
literature on University property" in violation of the University of Regina's
bylaws about traffic and parking.9 7 Although the Saskatchewan Court of
Queen's Bench found the bylaws to be ultra vires the university on the
grounds that littering had nothing to do with parking, Ball J. also held
that the Charterwould apply in this context because by enacting parking
bylaws the university was acting in the same way as a municipality.9 8 As
such, the University of Regina's regulation of its parking and traffic on
campus was in effect a government function caught by section 32. Not
surprisingly the bylaw was found to violate section 2(b) of the Charter
and was not saved under section 1 because a total ban is not minimal
impairment.99
In contrast to Whatcott (Regina), the plaintiffs in Gray v Alma Mater
Society ofthe University ofBritish Columbia conceded that the Charterdid
not apply. 100 Gray emerged out of an attempt to hold a graphic anti-abortion
display on campus, similar to the display that would cause controversy
in the more recent cases. Although the main display fell through, related
images were posted on campus and were then destroyed by other students.
Attempts to display the images were opposed by the Alma Mater Society
(AMS) and the plaintiffs alleged that AMS had acted in breach of contract
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and its fiduciary duties by not allowing them to display their images.10 1
Absent the Charter, arguments about contractual rights and fiduciary duties
were the only ones open to the plaintiffs. Unsurprisingly, the plaintiffs
failed in their attempt to turn academic freedom into an enforceable,
implied term of the contract between a university and its students,102 and
in their attempt to argue that they were owed fiduciary duties.103 Justice
Cohen observed that
the democratic rights which the plaintiffs seek to have enforced as
contractual terms are more appropriately dealt with in the context of
constitutional law. I think it is a correct statement by the defence that
the law of contract was never intended, nor is its use appropriate, to
balance and detennine the broad social rights sought to be enforced as
contractual terms by the plaintiffs.o4
Of course, the concession by the plaintiffs with respect to Charter
applicability meant that the constitutional argument was not heard.
The question of Charterapplicability has, however, been examined in
more depth in four recent cases dealing with anti-abortion protests similar
to those seen in Gray and Whatcott (Regina). In Whatcott (Calgary) the
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench found the Charterto apply to the actions
of the University of Calgary as they sought to ban William Whatcott from
its campus for distributing leaflets which were against homosexuality
and abortion.10 In Whatcott (Calgary), the university attempted to use
trespass legislation to prohibit Whatcott from its campus. The reason the
university's actions were caught by the Charterwas that they amounted
to a "denial of a learning opportunity." As learning opportunities are an
objective listed in Alberta's Post-Secondary Learning Act there was a
"direct connection between the institution's governmental mandate and
the impugned activity." 106
Wilson, a case which has a similar fact pattern to Gray but was about
the University of Calgary, also suggested that the Charter would apply to
the university. The particular action at issue in Wilson was the university's
non-academic misconduct proceedings brought against members of an
anti-abortion student group for failing to follow the instructions of campus
security about the manner of their protest.0 ' The students in question

101. Ibid at paras 5-6.
102. Ibid at para 89.
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Ibid at para 115.
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raised the Charter at every level of the process, including the university
appeals process and the Court of Queen's Bench.10 s The university tried
to argue that the Charterdid not apply but, even if it did, that it had acted
reasonably.1 0 9 Justice Homer disagreed with the university's claim to
have acted reasonably because the university appeals board did not show
that they had given "due regard" to the rights at stake.110 However, as
this was a judicial review, the appropriate remedy was for the Student
Discipline Appeal Committee to be convened to hear the students' case. 1
Consequently, the question of Charter applicability was not squarely
addressed, though it seems clear that Homer J. would have found it to
apply.
Two cases from Ontario and British Columbia, despite having a
similar fact pattern to Wilson, found that the Charterwould not apply to the
universities in question. In Lobo, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the
decision of the lower court to strike the Charterclaim from the plaintiff's
case. A unanimous Court held that when Carleton University was booking
space for "non-academic extra-curricular use, it is not implementing a
specific government policy or program as contemplated in Eldridge."1 12
At trial, Toscano Roccamo J. made much of the fact that the Carleton
UniversityAct created an autonomous body in a way that differed from the
113
situation in Pridgen.
Yet Toscano Roccamo J.'s decision was issued before the Alberta
Court of Appeal's decision in Pridgen. At the Court of Appeal, Papemy
J.A. emphasized both the public purpose of post-secondary education
and the coercion the university was entitled to use by way of statutory
authority. Lobo's dismissal of Charterapplicability is thus too superficial.
The Alberta cases, particularly Whatcott (Calgary), emphasize the link
between accessing campus and the dissemination of knowledge and it was
for this reason that the issue of access became linked to the purpose of
the university and thus to a governmental policy or program. As Wilson
J. noted in her dissent in McKinney, education is a traditional function
of governments in Canada and universities perform a public function,
particularly the "free exchange of ideas.""' One of the purposes of
108. Ibid at paras 143-147.
109. Ibid at paras 146-149.
110. Ibid at para 163.
111. Ibid at paras 180-181.
112. Lobo, supra note 2 at para 4.
113. Lobo v Carleton Univresity, 2012 ONSC 254 at para 14 [2012] OJ No 63. For the act, see
Carleton UniversityAct, SO 1952, c 117 as amended by SO 1957, c 130 & SO 1968-69, c 145, online:
<carleton.ca/secretariat/wp-content/uploads/University-Actl.pdf>.
114. McKinney, supra note 10 at 379.
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Carleton University, per its governing statute, is "the dissemination of
knowledge.""' Lobo distinction between "extra-curricular" activities
and education is too narrow a reading of Eldridge.
In BCCL, the British Columbia Supreme Court found that decisions
about how a university regulates its property are a sphere of "autonomous
operational decision-making reserved for the University."11 6 Much as with
Wilson and Lobo, BCCL was about an anti-abortion student group's attempt
to book university space to hold a protest comparing abortion to genocide
and to show related posters and movies."' As with Lobo, Hinkson C.'s
analysis of the section 32 jurisprudence left much to be desired. Instead of
tracing the evolution of the test for section 32 applicability, Hinkson C.J.
started with Eldridge and then referred to McKinney and Harrison.' This
pattern continued at the Court of Appeal, with Willcock J.A. observing
that
[t]he question whether the University of Victoria should be regarded as
an agent of government or equivalent to government for all purposes,
insofar as the application of the Charteris concerned, is settled by the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada inMcKinney, Stoffinan and in
particularHarrison."'
Justice Willcock dismissed any attempt to apply the Eldridge test on the
grounds that "[t]he government neither assumed nor retained any express
responsibility for the provision of a public forum for free expression on
university campuses."120
However, McKinney and Harrison were about retirement policies,
while Eldridgewas about access to medical services, and this distinction is
crucial. Auniversity's decisions over its staff members are not connected to
a government policy or program in the same way as access to educational
opportunities are. By holding that the decisions relating to the booking of
space are simply about property and thus within the autonomous sphere
of the university, Hinkson C.J. found them to be immune from Charter
review. Such decisions can still be reviewed on administrative law grounds
but the Charter will not apply. 121 Here Hinkson C.J. distinguished Dord v.
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Barreaudu Qudbec,1 2 2 because in that case the Barreau "was acting upon
its express grant of statutory authority in the discipline of its professional
member."1 2 3 Technically, the Barreau conceded the point about Charter
applicability and so a rigorous analysis of whether the Charter should
apply to all administrative decision makers has not yet taken place.
It seems strange, however, that a decision could be reviewed on
administrative law grounds but would not have to be Chartercompliant.1 24
Such a distinction was drawn in McKinney and cited with approval in
Eldridge with the exact phrasing being that "the basis of the exercise
of supervisory jurisdiction by the courts is not that universities are
government, but that they are public decision-makers."1 2 5 Immediately
after this quote from McKinney appeared in Eldridge, La Forest J. observed
that "[i]n order for the Charterto apply to a private entity it must be found
to be implementing a specific governmental policy or program." 12 6 In other
words, universities are supervised by the courts because they are public but
immune from Charter review because they are sufficiently autonomous
from government to be considered private. Again this seems like further
evidence of the courts' struggle to find a way to distinguish public and
private and thus figure out which actions must be Charter compliant.
The University of Victoria may be autonomous but its authority
flows from statute and so too does its authority to deal with matters of
student discipline and to regulate its property. 12 7 As such, it and other
public universities seem to fit within the fourth category of section 32
cases identified by Papemy JA.: "[b]odies exercising statutory authority"
particularly those which have an authority to regulate which is greater
than that of a "private citizen or corporation."12 8 In terms of regulating
university property, Whatcott (Regina) found the University of Regina to
be acting akin to a municipality and thus the Charter would apply. As
the University Act gives universities in British Columbia greater powers
to regulate their property than exist for a private landowner, it seems
as though the Charter should apply in questions of who can hold what

122. Dore v Barreau du Quebec, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 SCR 395 [Dore].
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activities on campus. Often, the property of public universities is subject
to special protections and exemptions that,1 29 while not a coercive power
per se, are a way to protect university property so that it might be used for
university purposes. In other words, if a university's role is, as courts in
Alberta have found, closely linked with its physical space then access to
that space for the purposes of expression might well be protected by the
Charter.
III. The Charterand University Space
It is no surprise that public universities should seek to argue that the Charter
does not apply to them under any circumstances. Yet it is also clear that
McKinney is badly in need of an update. The divergence between provinces
with respect to whether or not the Charter applies to public universities
has led to calls for the Supreme Court to revisit the issue of universities
130
and the Charter.
Such calls seem particularly urgent given that current
split between provinces is the result of different facts than were at issue
in McKinney. The recent cases are about student discipline and attempts
to access university property for the purposes of free expression.13 1 These
situations are more obviously tied to the central role of universities than
mandatory retirement policies. The need for the Supreme Court's guidance
is all the more pressing given that students, particularly those in antiabortion groups, are increasingly turning to the courts to guarantee their
rights to use university property.13 2 The refusal on the part of universities
and university student societies to allow these protests or the universities'
decisions to impose stricter restrictions on these protests invokes a range
of questions both about the limits of free expression and of the right of
students and others to use university space for these purposes. Attempts
to read Charter rights into the contractual relationship between students
and universities have failed.1 33 Yet it is likely that the Charter could or
should apply to universities in some contexts. Justice Wilson's dissent in
McKinney remains pertinent and is in keeping with later decisions such
as Eldridge. In providing education with privileges and powers granted

129. Carleton UniversityAct, supranote 113, ss 9-10; York UniversityAct, SO 1965, c 143, ss 18-20.

130. Silletta, supra note 8 at 98.
131. The discipline cases are Pridgen, supra note 11 and Telfer, supra note 9. Wilson, supra note 2
involved both a disciplinary action and a question of the use of space.
132. Cameron Wilson, "UAlberta Pro-Life: Explanation for Suing University Administration"
The Gateway (14 October 2015), online: <www.thegatewayonline.ca/20 15/10/ualberta-pro-lifeexplanation-for-suing-university-administration>; Jamie Sarkonak, "U ofA Sued by Pro-Life Student
Group: Says the University Violated the Code of Student Conduct Behaviour" The Gateway (29
September 2015), online: <www.thegatewayonline.ca/2015/09/u-of-a-sued-by-pro-life-studentgroup-says-the-university-violated-the-code-of-student-conduct-behaviour>.
133. See Gray, supra note 7 atpara 115.
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by statute-particularly with respect to their students and propertyunversities are not as obviously exempt from the Charter as they might
think. Certainly, there will still be certain acts of the university which will
not be caught by the Charter, such as mandatory retirement policies. The
more interesting question is what a finding of Charterapplicability would
mean for university property and what criteria could be used to determine
if and when such property is available for section 2(b) rights?
In Eldridge the issue was about enabling the access of differentlyabled patients to medical services. It was thus an equality argument rather
than one about free expression. While Eldridge's finding could have an
impact on hospital property-it would, for example, seem to require that
everyone be equally able to access hospital buildings and so on-it would
not grant anyone the right to use hospital property for free expression.
As far as I am aware no one has argued that they have a right to free
expression on hospital property. The obvious answer to such a claim is
that a person would not have the right to use hospital property for free
expression because that is not the purpose of hospitals. The same cannot
be said for universities.
When the Supreme Court of Canada has examined the question of
access and use of property for free expression they have made some limits
quite clear. For one thing, even when property is owned by government
that will not automatically make it available for free expression. In order
to determine whether government-owned property is available for free
expression the Court has devised a two part test, first used by the majority
in Montreal (City).1 3 4 The first is the "historical or actual function of the
place" and the second is "whether other aspects of the place suggest
that expression within it would undermine the values underlying free
expression."135 In some ways this test is an extension of and an expansion
on McLachlin J.'s discussion of public and private government property
136
in Commonwealth of Canada.
Some places such as streets and parks
are clearly readily available and, historically, have been used for free
expression. Other spaces are less clear cut, and in such circumstances
the question becomes "[w]ould an open right to intrude and present one's
message by word or action be consistent with what is done in the space?"1 3 7
Certain kinds of university property would clearly fall into the private
sphere: residences, offices, classrooms, libraries and so on. Even the open

134.
135.
136.
137.

Montreal (City), supra note 15 at para 74.
Ibid.
Commonwealth of Canada, supra note 15 at 228-237.
Montreal (City), supra note 15 at para 76.
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quads and connecting pathways of university campuses might be more
private than an ordinary street. During exam time, for example, a university
might seek to limit the kinds of activities held in these open spaces in order
to promote an environment conducive to studying.1 3 8 Yet this is suggestive
of a stronger regulatory right on the part of the university, not an absolute
right to ban whomever it pleases from campus. Here Whatcott's activities
on the University of Regina and the University of Calgary's campuses
provide good examples of the kind of activity that would be in keeping
with the quiet use of a university's open spaces.
Thus the first question that must be asked about whether university
property will be available for section 2(b) is whether the nature of the
protest fits with the normal use of the relevant property?1 3 9 As such, certain
kinds of posters might not be appropriate in residence buildings but would
be more appropriate in classroom buildings, with marches and the like
being similarly limited to non-residential buildings and areas on campus.
A related second question would examine whether there is anything else,
such as an ongoing examination period, that would justify placing limits
on certain kinds of protests?
Of course, university campuses have also been a traditional-if
sometimes contested-site of protest.140 In this regard they are often more
like streets, parks, and public squares than malls have ever been. University
spaces are and have always been the site of debate and discussion; it
seems clear that the historical function test would find free expression on
university property to fit with the values underlying free expression. Here
the nature of universities as institutions offers an additional justification
for holding their spaces open for free expression. The very purpose of
a university is to foster debate and discussion. It is this purpose that is
often missed and which would perhaps continue to be missed in battles
over access to university space. It is not just that university property is
compatible with free expression but that free expression is central to the
property in question.1 4 1
Free expression and academic freedom do not overlap perfectly,
however. Academic freedom is more abstract and less reliant on physical
space than free expression, and is generally understood as being limited to
the university's researchers rather than extending to its students and staff.

138. As was the case in Queen s University, supra note 50, where the injunction was sought for the
exam period.
139. This is a variation of the question asked in Queen &University, supra note 50.
140. By contested, I mean that universities have been subjected to sit-ins and similar protests by
students against actions of the administration
141. Cameron, supra note 14 at 302-303.
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Academic freedom also speaks more to the relationships among university
researchers, their colleagues, and superiors rather than the individual-state
relationship invoked by a Charter claim. Moreover, even if university
campuses are suitable for free expression, as with all property open to
free expression, the expressive right will not be absolute and can be quite
effectively regulated, even to the point of defacto non-existence.
Supreme Court jurisprudence has made it clear that government
entities can regulate who uses their property and can charge fees for it.
Courts will not, for example, hold that anyone can demand to post an
advert on public transit free of charge. Yet, if a transit authority does
allow adverts to be posted, they cannot arbitrarily prohibit certain kinds
of expression, such as political adverts, as GVTA made clear. The transit
authority's attempt to regulate what might be controversial speech went
too far because "[c]itizens... are expected to put up with some controversy
in a free and democratic society." 1 4 2
These comments lead to a third question that ought to be asked in
deciding whether university property will be available for free expression:
is the expression at issue hate speech? The problem with the third question
is determining what constitutes hate speech. The current definition is that
which "incite[s] the level of abhorrence, delegitimization and rejection that
risks causing discrimination or other harmful effects." 143 In other words,
the goal is to guard against discrimination. This goal stems from the fact
that the most recent case about hate speech centred on the definition of
hatred in the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code1 4 4 and human rights codes
are aimed at ending discrimination and promoting equality.
How the matter of controversial or offensive speech should play
out on university campuses is a thorny issue. As Sorial's examination
of manufactured authority and its relation to hate speech makes clear,
unversities can confer an air of legitimacy on otherwise unpalatable views.
She gives the example of some French universities granting "postgraduate
research degrees for Holocaust denial theses."14 1 Sorial finds this troubling
on the grounds that intellectuals play a key role in French public life, but
a more damning critique might be that the Holocaust as historical fact is
beyond all doubt. We would not treat a World War II historian who denied
the fact of the D-Day landings as a serious scholar, so why would we do
the same for someone who denied the Holocaust? Academic history tends

142. GVTA, supra note 27 at para 77.
143. WhatcottHRC, supranote 77 at para 57.

144. SS 1979, c S-24.1.
145. Sorial, supra note 78 at 72.
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to be about the interpretation of the facts rather than arguing over whether
something did or did not happen.
Admittedly the distinction between facts and the interpretation of those
facts can be a hard line to draw but it could be helpful in distinguishing
hate speech from offensive speech. After all, hate speech typically relies
on falsehoods to incite discrimination against the targeted group. Here
Whatcott (HRC) offers a good example of the fineness of the line that is
drawn between asserted facts and interpretations of facts. The Supreme
Court upheld the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission's finding that
two of Whatcott's flyers constituted hate speech but overturned it with
respect to two other flyers. The two which were not hate speech were
reprints of a page of classified adverts with Whatcott's handwritten
commentary, while the two which were hate speech were in the style
of letters or articles.146 The difference between these flyers is that the
reprinted adverts were more obviously Whatcott's interpretation of
what the classified adverts represented-in this case the allegation that
homosexuals are pedophiles-than the two letters or articles which could
be more readily mistaken as fact. Admittedly, the court did not distinguish
the flyers on the basis of asserted facts versus interpretation of evidence,
but it is clear that is what is going on and better accounts for the line
the court ultimately drew. In a sense, it is also in keeping with the truthseeking aspects of free expression, but the distinction between facts and
interpretations of those facts often strikes a fine balance between speech
we agree with and speech we do not.
Assuming that the anti-abortion protests on campus fall short of hate
speech and are merely offensive does not necessarily mean a university
has to let protesters use university space."' Even municipalities are
entitled to regulate streets and parks out of concerns for public safety
and free movement of people."' The concern about safety is one which
has repeatedly reared its head in terms of the regulation of anti-abortion
146. Whatcott (HRC), supra note 77 at paras 182-196. The flyers were reprinted in the Appendix to
the decision.
147. Given that many of the anti-abortion protests compare abortion to genocide, there is an argument
to be made that this constitutes hate speech given that it exposes abortion clinics, their staff, and
patients to a level of abhorrence which could result in discrimination. At the same time, however,
these people may not be a readily identifiable group and, as such, will not be covered by hate speech
provisions. Certainly, it is clear that anti-abortion rhetoric can and has incited people to violence
against abortion providers but whether this is justification for restricting anti-abortionists' expression
is less clear. See also the debate around the holding of Israeli Apartheid Week on Canadian University
Campuses: Richard Moon, "Demonstrations on Campus and the Case of Israeli Apartheid Week" in
Turk, supra note 14 at 185.
148. Zhang, supra note 15 paras 38-39. See also Nicholas Blomley, "How to Turn a Beggar into a Bus
Stop: Law, Traffic, and the 'Function of the Place"' (2007) 44:9 Urban Studies 1697.
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protests on campus, not necessarily because the protesters themselves are
violent but because they can provoke violent reactions.1 4 9 Accordingly,
the fourth question that ought to be asked in decisions about granting
protesters the use of university property is whether or not the protest raises
any safety concerns.
It is, perhaps, unfair to the protesters to limit their right to free
expression because of the reactions of others-something which is beyond
their control and is effectively punishing them for another's wrongful
act. However, the potential for violent responses can be planned for and
several universities have proposed that anti-abortion groups pay extra
or that they would be charged extra to cover enhanced security.5 o Such
limits are precisely the kinds of limits that the Supreme Court has implied
would be justified in the municipal regulation of streets. In Ramsden v.
Peterborough,for example, an outright ban on postering on lampposts and
so on was struck down because it was overbroad, yet the Court opined that
the city would be entitled to charge for the use of its property."' Where
such extra payments pose problems for universities is that they are often
imposed asymmetrically and could be interpreted as a tax for holding
an unpopular opinion. At the same time, however, the jurisprudence has
made it clear that blanket bans on particular kinds of free expression are
unacceptable. The problem with such a holding is that it is not a challenging
bar to overcome; it is often a matter of having some kind of route to win an
exemption, even if no such exemptions are ever granted.1 5 2
The other issue with the question of Charter applicability is whether
it only applies in the context of the relationship between the university
and its students or whether it applies between the university and anyone
seeking an educational opportunity. The latter situation is the conclusion
to be drawn from Whatcott (Calgary), but it seems too broad a ruling.
For one thing, Whatcott was unaffiliated with the university at the time
of his arrest for trespass. Universities simply do not have the resources,
or the space, to be required to let anyone access and use their campuses
and buildings as they so choose. Understanding the Charterto govern the
relationship between a university and its students is more in keeping with
the decision in Pridgen and continues to respect a university's autonomy

149. This has been named as an issue at the University of Victoria and the University of Calgary:
BCCL, supra note 1 at paras 58, 75; Wilson, supra note 2 at paras 4, 7, 132.
150. Wilson, supra note 2 at para 175 (the issue of whether the university could do this was not
properly before the court).
151. Ramsden, supra note 15 at 1107.

152. In Zhang Vancouver's regulation against structures on city streets failed because there was no
procedure to apply for an exemption, Zhang, supra note 15 at paras 39, 66-69.
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over who its students are. Insofar as universities can be caught by section
32 their acts of government only affect the university community.
As such, the fifth question about accessing university property might
be who is seeking to access it. Here, the line-drawing could be affected
by the size and manner of the free expression. Whatcott's protests have
tended to be fairly solitary and, just as municipalities require permits for
marches but not always for distributing leaflets, the bigger problem would
be if a group otherwise unaffiliated with the university wished to hold
a demonstration on campus. Just as university education, even in public
universities, is not free and is only open to those capable of reaching
defined academic standards, university property is primarily for those
affiliated with the university, even if it is publicly accessible.
The five questions I have suggested-does the nature of the protest fit
with the normal use of the relevant university property; is there anything
else, such as an ongoing exam period, which would justify placing limits
on certain kinds of protests; is the expression at issue hate speech; does the
expression at issue raise any safety concerns; and who is trying to access
university property-are not necessarily exhaustive. They are based on
pre-existing case law about public property, university property, and free
expression, but they are not a guarantee that university property will be
available for free expression. Regardless of whether or not the Charter
does apply to public universities, universities could use these questions to
help justify their decision for or against granting permission for particular
protests.
Of course, even if the Charter does apply to universities when they
make decisions about who gets to use their space, the situation may not
necessarily be that different than it is now. Anti-abortion protesters could
still find themselves unable to access campus in the way that they might
wish to. The only potential difference would be that they have a court
decision saying that their section 2(b) rights have been violated but that
the violation was saved by section 1 of the Charter. A more important
conclusion from the question of who can access university space might be
how challenging it is to actually rely on section 2(b) rights in situations
where a person is trying to gain access to a larger communicative forum
than is otherwise available to them. Consequently, university campuses are
more like malls in that universities retain much stronger rights to revoke
an invitation to access than municipalities do with parks and streets.
Conclusion
Canada's public universities might seem like the quintessential place for
free expression and rigorous debate about controversial issues but, as this
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article has shown, that is not the case. Recent cases from across Canada
have exposed both that universities and those affiliated with them have
refused to allow certain groups to protest on campus, and that courts
(with the exception of courts in Alberta and Saskatchewan) have upheld
a university's right to do so. As much as these cases raise questions about
whether and in what circumstances public universities ought to be Charter
compliant, they also raise questions about public spaces and the regulation
of property. Insofar as public universities make claims to have private
property in their campuses, they do not rigidly enforce this claim and, in
fact, at times seem to invite members of the public onto campus. Even if
universities are correct in their claim that they have private property in
their campus, if the Charter does apply to them-and it seems clear that it
should in some contexts-then university property ought to be considered
at least partially public space. Such a finding would not grant a blanket
right of access to university campuses for free expression but would place
some limits on how a university goes about deciding which groups can use
its spaces and for what purposes.

